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Introduction
While judicial independence is a well-established principle in European
constitutionalism, the same does not apply to judicial accountability. In both
judicial reforms and academic scholarship, the discourse on judicial independence
has indeed overshadowed that of judicial accountability.1 Yet, the Council
of Europe itself, long at the forefront of promoting judicial independence,
acknowledged the relevance of the latter in Opinion No. 18 (2015) of the
Consultative Council of European Judges, on the legitimacy and accountability of
the judiciary.2 Hence, it is particularly important to understand how the principle
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comments that significantly improved the original manuscript. The research leading to this
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1F. Contini and R. Mohr, ‘Reconciling independence and accountability of judicial systems’, 2
Utrecht Law Review (2007) p. 26; D. Piana, Judicial Accountabilities in New Europe: From Rule of
Law to Quality of Justice (Farnham 2010); D. Kosař, Perils of Judicial Self-Government in Transitional
Societies (Cambridge University Press 2016) p. 14.
2Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion No. 18 (2015), The position of the judiciary
and its relation with the other powers of state in a modern democracy. The Consultative Council
of European Judges is an advisory body of the Council of Europe on issues relating to the
independence, impartiality and competence of judges. It is composed exclusively of judges.
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of accountability is interpreted and relates to political backgrounds within specific
national contexts.
In this regard, Italy is an important case study. While the Italian Constitution
explicitly guarantees judicial independence, it does not refer to judicial
accountability.3 Italy is also one of the first European countries to have adopted
a strong judicial council model of court administration.4 This model later served
as a template promoted by the European Union and the Council of Europe in
Central and Eastern Europe for increasing judicial independence.5 At the same
time, looking at debates held within the Constituent Assembly in 1946 and 1947,
one can see that the Italian drafters extensively linked the judicial council
with accountability issues from its very inception.6 Moreover, legal writings
show that judicial accountability (‘responsabilità del giudice’) has long been a subject
of study for Italian legal scholars.7 Finally, judicial accountability, and more
specifically the relationship between the judiciary and politics, played a role in the
‘regime crisis’ sparked by the collapse of the party system between 1992 and 1994.8
As a result, projects for reform addressing a proper balance in how, and to whom,
judges should be accountable have marked the politico-legal discussion over the
last 25 years.
This article analyses how the politico-legal debate has affected institutional
reforms of judicial accountability in Italy since the enactment of the Constitution
of the Italian Republic in 1948. It discusses the interaction between measures
aimed at reshaping the accountability framework and the underlying political
motivation for them.
3G. Di Federico, ‘Independence and Accountability of the Judiciary in Italy: The Experience of a
Former Transitional Country in Comparative Perspective’, in A. Sajó (ed.), Judicial Integrity
(Martinus Nijhoff 2004) p. 181 at p. 182. The judiciary is qualified as independent by Art. 104 of
the Constitution, and Art. 101 states that judges are subject to the law. No provision refers to
accountability, contrary to other state bodies and functions; see e.g. Art. 97 on civil servants.
4N. Garoupa and T. Ginsburg, ‘Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial
Independence’, 57 American Journal of Comparative Law (2009) p. 103 at p. 107.
5M. Bobek and D. Kosař, ‘Global Solutions, Local Damages: A Critical Study in Judicial
Councils in Central and Eastern Europe’, 7 German Law Journal (2014) p. 1268.
6S. Benvenuti, ‘Magistrature’ [‘Judiciaries’], in A. Buratti and M. Fioravanti, Costituenti ombra.
Altri luoghi e altre figure della cultura politica italiana nella stagione della Costituente [Shadow
constituents: alternative places and figures of Italian political culture in the constituent phase] (Carocci
2010) p. 385.
7See G. Volpe, ‘Sulla responsabilità politica dei giudici’ [‘On judges’ political accountability’], in E.
Tosato (ed.), Scritti in onore di Costantino Mortati. Aspetti e tendenze del diritto costituzionale
[Writings in honour of Costantino Mortati. Selected issues and trends in constitutional law] (Giuffrè
1977) p. 809; M. Cappelletti, ‘Who Watches the Watchmen? A Comparative Study on Judicial
Responsibility’, 1 American Journal of Comparative Law (1983) p. 1; V. Vigoriti, La responsabilità del
giudice [The accountability of the judge] (Il Mulino 1984), and literature referred to at p. 15, fn 4.
8Di Federico, supra n. 3, p. 195.
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The concept of accountability lends itself to different meanings.9 Drawing on
recent scholarship, this article defines judicial accountability as amechanism, i.e. as
‘an institutional relationship in which a judge can be held to account by a forum’,
which may entail negative or positive consequences (sanctions and rewards).10
This definition is narrower than the one adopted in Opinion No. 18 (2015)11 and
requires some clarification. Following the conceptualisation of accountability
provided by recent scholarship, this article is interested in three dimensions:
(i) who is accountable; (ii) to whom; and (iii) through what processes.12
This article deals with both ordinary (i.e. non-constitutional) judges and
prosecutors in Italy, who largely share the same institutional framework. It focuses
on the main institution to which judges are accountable – the Consiglio superiore
della magistratura, the judicial council introduced in 1948 by the Constitution –
and on the interaction among the principal actors within that council. It discusses
only the three most important accountability mechanisms in the Italian situation:
those affecting judicial careers, disciplinary responsibility, and civil liability. With
regard to the first issue, a judicial career can be influenced by a variety of
instruments, either ‘sticks’ or ‘carrots’; these include appointments to vacant
positions, salary increases, and evaluations (positive or negative). On the second
issue, disciplinary responsibility is a classical mechanism of judicial accountability,
mostly related to legal or ethical (mis-) conduct, yet the approach to it can change
over time and does so in the case under examination. Finally, civil liability most
often works as a sanctioning mechanism insofar as it entails censure of judges’
decision-making behaviour and payment of damages.13 Judicial accountability
debates often overlook this mechanism, but its political salience in the Italian
context and the repeated reforms are particularly illuminating.
The aim of this article is not to investigate the practice of holding judges
accountable, which is often termed de facto judicial accountability.14 The real
9See e.g. M. Bovens, ‘Two Concepts of Accountability: Accountability as a Virtue and as a
Mechanism’, 33 West European Politics (2010) p. 946.
10Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 57. Judicial accountability mechanisms exist in any political system, even
though in liberal-democratic regimes they need to fit with the normative requirement of avoiding
undue influence. Their function is to connect judges with given environments and to reflect their
values and expectations, also termed judicial virtues. They are just one device, among others,
establishing such a connection, and the whole accountability framework can be understood only in
such a broad context.
11See paras. 20-33.
12Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 40 ff. highlights six conceptual dimensions of judicial accountability: (i) who is
accountable; (ii) to whom; (iii) through what processes; (iv) for what; (v) by what standards; and (vi) with
what effects. While the first three dimensions are of interest here, the remaining dimensions are touched
upon only indirectly, being strictly interrelated to the former ones.
13Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 82.
14Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 65 ff.
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effects of institutional reform are inferred from the existing literature. Instead, this
article analyses the rationales and justifications for institutional reform and argues
that it is difficult to ensure a proper and stable balance-of-accountability
framework in abstracto and ex ante in a general way, due to the ever-changing
underlying socio-political conditions. Fixed, one-size-fits-all templates cannot
ensure balance.15 More specifically, this article demystifies the myth of the Italian
‘self-governing’ Consiglio superiore della magistratura. According to this myth, the
Italian judicial council, made up of a majority of judges charged with
administering a system free from political interferences (hence ‘self-governing’),
is mostly seen as the tool for independence. As we will see, a self-governing judicial
body does not, however, necessarily enhance judicial independence, and can even
undermine it under certain circumstances. Italian and international scholars share
this conclusion,16 yet the myth still prevails when it comes to analysing judicial
reform in Europe.17What is often neglected, as the Italian case can teach us, is that
judicial councils are flexible tools for achieving a balance in judicial accountability.
The structure of this article is as follows. The first section introduces the essential
features of the Italian judiciary and the political background of its evolution during
the post-war era of the Italian Republic. Subsequently, the Consiglio superiore della
magistratura’s functioning with regard to accountability mechanisms is analysed,
followed by a discussion of three key areas of reform affecting judicial accountability:
the rules regulating the career system, notably evaluation, promotion, and
appointment to specific positions;18 the rules regulating disciplinary responsibility;
and those regulating the civil liability of judges.19 The last section focuses on the
broader repercussions of the Italian case study.
Essential features of the Italian judiciary and the political
conditions of its post-war development
The Italian judicial system is similar to the French-derived bureaucratic model.20
Accordingly, the judge is a public officer who enters the profession at a young age
15Any institutional framework indeed has the function of funnelling the relationships among the
relevant actors within a given context. The characters of the actors and the context in which they
operate are therefore crucial.
16Garoupa and Ginsburg, supra n. 4, p. 106.
17Bobek and Kosař, supra, n. 5.
18Career accountability mechanisms therefore include both rewards and dual mechanisms, Kosař,
supra n. 1, p. 87. I refer here to assignment to vacant positions (sometimes referred to as promotion), not
to first appointment of judicial apprentices after they have passed a public competitive examination.
19On civil liability as an accountability mechanism see Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 73 and 82.
20C. Guarnieri and P. Pederzoli, The Power of Judges. A Comparative Study of Courts and
Democracy (Oxford University Press 2002) p. 54. On the origins of the Italian judicial system,
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and passes through various stages of advancement. The career system of the Italian
judiciary is therefore modelled on the typical features of the State’s bureaucracy.21
At the same time, the Italian system has very specific historical origins.
While the French model, introduced by Napoleon, rested on the principle of
the unity of the State,22 the Italian judiciary was geographically and socially
fragmented. Until 1923, Italy had five regionally-based courts of cassazione (or
Italian Supreme Courts),23 and a tradition of judges’ engagement with judicial
politics reflected in the establishment of the General Association of Magistrates as
early as 1909.24 This fragmented judiciary was embedded in a centralised system of
judicial administration within the Ministry of Justice, in which bodies of elected
judges were created with the task of participating in the management of the
judiciary; these bodies only had advisory competences.25
seeM. D’Addio, Politica e magistratura (1848-1876) [Politics and the judiciary (1848-1876)] (Giuffrè
1966).
21Guarnieri and Pederzoli, supra n. 20, p. 49 f.
22The ‘unity of the State’ approach considered the judicial function to be part of the executive
function, and the judicial authorities a branch of executive power, M. Troper, La separation des
pouvoirs et l’histoire constitutionnelle française, I (LGDJ 1980). On the general features of the French
judicial organisation see T. Renoux and A. Roux, L’administration de la justice en France (PUF 1994);
P. Truche, Justice e institutions judiciaires (La documentation française 2001).
23After the creation of the Italian State, the unification of the judicial system was not fully
achieved and the Supreme Courts of Turin, Florence, Naples, and Palermo remained. In 1875, the
Supreme Court of Rome was created by Law n. 2837 of 12 December 1875, having also the
competence to decide on conflicts of jurisdiction among the former courts. M. Taruffo, ‘L’incerta
trasformazione della Corte di cassazione italiana’, in C. Besso and S. Chiarloni (eds.), Problemi e
prospettive delle corti supreme: esperienze a confronto [Problems and perspectives of supreme courts:
comparing experiences] (ESI 2012) p. 123 at 123 ff.
24The Associazione Generale dei Magistrati d’Italia (AGMI) was founded in 1909 and had over
2,000 associate members in 1914, for a judicial body comprising between 4,000 and 5,000
magistrates, A. Pizzorusso, L’organizzazione della giustizia in Italia. La magistratura nel sistema politico
e istituzionale [The organisation of justice in Italy. The judiciary in the political and institutional system]
(Einaudi 1990) p. 55-60, A. Meniconi, ‘La storia dell’associazionismo giudiziario: alcune notazioni’
[‘Notes on the history of judicial associations’], 4 Questione giustizia (2015) p. 220 at p. 223-224.
25Electivity of self-government bodies dates back to the Law n. 511 of 15 July 1907 establishing
the first Consiglio superiore della magistratura composed of magistrates partly elected by the five
regional courts of cassation. Just after Mussolini’s rise to power, Royal Decree n. 2537 of 23 October
1923 laid down that all members of the judicial council were to be appointed by the Minister of
Justice. While the first contemporary judicial council was established in France by the Constitution
of 27 October 1946 (Arts. 83 and 84), the roots of such a template based on self-government must
therefore be found in Italy. Here, under the Statuto albertino an ‘Italian “way” to judicial
organisation [developed,] characterised by the inclusion, within the predominant [French-derived]
public-service model, of substantial elements of the corporatist model’ functional to the integration
of social bodies and civil society in the State, G. Volpe, ‘Le origini dell’organizzazione corporativa
della magistratura e i poteri normativi del CSM’ [‘The origins of the corporatist organisation of the
judiciary and the normative powers of the CSM’], in A. Pace et al. (eds.), Problemi attuali della giustizia
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The Fascist regime (1922-1943) did not radically change the organisation of
the Italian judiciary, although centralisation and internal hierarchisation became
more pronounced. Most significantly, the five courts of cassazione merged into a
single body in 1923, and the reform muffled the elective character of the ‘self-
governing’ bodies. In addition, the General Association of Magistrates was banned
in 1926.26
The above events explain why the 1948 constitutional remodelling was deemed
necessary. The new Constitution devoted a specific chapter to the judicial
system.27 It set out the source of legitimacy of justice (it must be exercised ‘in the
name of the people’) together with the principle of judicial independence (‘Judges
are subject only to the law’).28 It provided that recruitment must follow national
competitive examinations while at the same time admitting the possibility of
‘lateral’ recruitment.29 It envisaged a judicial council made up of a majority of
magistrates.30 It established strong guarantees of judicial independence such as the
principle of the legal judge (‘giudice naturale’)31 and the rule of irrevocability of
in Italia, Atti del Seminario di studio tenuto a Roma l’8 giugno 2009 [Current problems of justice in Italy.
Proceedings of the study seminar held in Rome on 8 June 2009] (Jovene 2010), p. 81 at
p. 84.
26Royal Decree of 16 December 1926.
27Chapter IV, establishing the essential principles and rules concerning judicial organisation
(Articles 101-110) and the exercise of the judicial function (Arts. 111-113).
28Art. 101.
29As mentioned, judges normally enter the profession at a young age ‘at the bottom’ and go
through various stages of advancement. Art. 106 of the Italian Constitution adds the possibility of
recruitment of judges at the Court of cassazione with previous outstanding experience as university
professors of law or advocates.
30Arts. 104 (composition) and 105 (powers). In describing the composition of the Consiglio
superiore della magistratura, the former starts by stating that ‘the Judiciary is a branch that is
autonomous and independent of all other powers’ (‘La magistratura costituisce un ordine autonomo
e indipendente da ogni altro potere’). The principle of autonomy and independence of the judicial
branch has been the object of wide scholarly attention. See e.g. G.F. Ferrari, ‘Consiglio superiore
della magistratura, autonomia dell’ordine giudiziario e magistrati’ [‘Consiglio superiore della
magistratura, autonomy of the judiciary and magistrates’], in Studi in memoria di Carlo Esposito
[Studies in memory of Carlo Esposito], IV (CEDAM 1974) p. 2263, and S. Bartole, Autonomia e
indipendenza dell’ordine giudiziario [Autonomy and independence of the judiciary] (CEDAM 1964).
The relevant literature is in Italian and, unfortunately, there is to my knowledge no comparative essay
in English on this topic. With due caution, the concept is close to the ‘independence of the judiciary’
often referred to in international literature – a concept that is sometimes mixed up with that of the
independence of judges, as pointed out by Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 408.
31Art. 25(1). The principle has been implemented via an automatic system of case assignment, on
which see G. Silvestri, Giustizia e giudici nel sistema costituzionale [Justice and judges in the
constitutional system] (Giappichelli 1997) p. 169 ff. Thus, the assignment of cases to ‘favoured’ judges
is not possible (but different rules exist for prosecutors). On case assignment as a ‘dual accountability
mechanism’ see Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 55 and 91.
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judges.32 It introduced the principle that all judges are equal and differences may
only derive from the functions they exercise.33 Finally, it introduced the obligation
for prosecutors to institute criminal proceedings in order to avoid arbitrariness.34
Overall, the new framework addressed the shortcomings of the bureaucratic roots
of the Italian judiciary, and in particular the reduced status of a judge as equal to
that of any common civil servant and subject to the same criteria for career
advancement.35 Yet the establishment of a new judicial organisation was neither
linear nor carved in stone, as the original constitutional compromise was open to
divergent developments.36
First, the 1948 Constitution did not regulate in detail the system of judicial
guarantees (‘guarentigie’: irrevocability, disciplinary responsibility, supervision,
etc), although in Article 107(3) it established the principle of the equality of
judges, thus indirectly ruling out formal judicial hierarchy. Instead, it included a
transitional provision establishing that until a new law on the judiciary in
accordance with the Constitution was issued, existing laws would remain in
force.37 A new general law on the judiciary was, however, not immediately
adopted and the overall structure of the judiciary initially remained similar to that
of the interwar era. Judicial guarantees were only partially regulated and
magistrates simply divided into three categories according to their functions.38
This delay in implementation resulted from the convergence of interests
between Christian Democrats (Democrazia Cristiana, the main party in
government) and higher judges. The former were not eager to implement
judicial guarantees due to the political proximity to the conservative higher
judiciary in the first post-war period. This resulted in an equilibrium based on the
external accountability of the judiciary to the Christian Democratic Minister of
Justice filtered through the informal influence of the upper judicial hierarchy in
32Art. 107(1). Art. 69 of the Statuto Albertino of 1848 recognised the principle while at the same
time limiting it.
33Art. 107(3) of the Italian Constitution.
34Art. 112.
35Vigoriti, supra n. 7, p. 157; N. Zanon and F. Biondi, Il sistema costituzionale della magistratura
[The constitutional system of the judiciary] (Zanichelli 2014) p. 279. On the ‘bureaucratic’ and
‘professional’ ideal-types of judicial organisation see Guarnieri and Pederzoli, supra n. 20, p. 66 f.
36For almost 70 years, the Italian institutional debate has been continually enlivened by the
question of the reform of the judicial system (‘Ordinamento giudiziario’), Pizzorusso, supra n. 24,
p. 37-60. On the debate on the reform of the judicial council see also S. Benvenuti, Il Consiglio
superiore della magistratura francese. Una comparazione con l’esperienza italiana [The French High
council for the judiciary. A comparison with the Italian experience] (Giuffrè 2010) p. 1-72.
37VII transitional provision of the Italian Constitution.
38See respectively Royal Decree n. 511 of 31 May 1946, and Art. 1 of Law n. 392 of 24 May
1951. The latter provides that ‘ordinary judges are distinguished based on their functions as judges of
tribunal, judges of court of appeal, judges of Court of cassation’.
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appointments, promotions, etc, formally decided by the Minister of Justice.
Members of the higher judiciary kept their grip on the judiciary, also after the
actual establishment of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura in 1958 owing to
the category-based electoral system for judicial representatives;39 the structure of
the judiciary remained pyramidal.
Impetus for reform was two-fold. Internally, the judiciary was subject to a
process of democratisation; lower judges started challenging the hierarchical
patterns and the lower judges managed to dominate the National Magistrates’
Association. That Association was established in 1944 as a successor to the
General Association of Magistrates. It acted as a forum in which judges gathered
in different groups (‘correnti’) to discuss judicial policies.40 Added to this were
external pressures. The Communist Party, which was excluded from government,
supported legislative implementation of constitutional guarantees that would
enhance the position of less conservative lower judges, since they could rely on
them as a channel to influence the political process. Lower judges could
refer questions to the Constitutional Court to challenge judicial policies,41
while the Consiglio superiore della magistratura itself was also potentially a
device for challenging or discussing these policies. This also explains why
lower judges and the Communist party supported an extensive reading of
the council’s powers, i.e. not limited to appointments, promotions and
disciplinary responsibility.42 Under these pressures, between the 1960s and the
39As expounded below (see n. 62), higher judges were thus able to dominate the Consiglio
superiore della magistratura.
40C. Guarnieri, ‘Judicial Independence in Europe: Threat or Resource for Democracy’, 3
Representation (2013) p. 347 at p. 350. Initially, senior judges ruled the National Magistrates’
Association. However, in 1957 a new generation of judges, so-called ‘innovatori’ (reformers), gained
the leadership and alienated the senior judges away from the Association. Starting from the 1960s a
process of institutionalisation of these groups of judges brought to the establishment ‘correnti’,
formal associations acting within the broader National Magistrates’ Association through their
representatives. On the relevance of associations for understanding the development of the Italian
judicial organisation, see A. Giuliani and N. Picardi, La responsabilità del giudice [The accountabilty of
the judge] (Giuffrè 1995) p. 154 ff.
41Law n. 87 of 11 March 1953 conferred upon any lower court the power to refer a question to
the Constitutional Court. This power potentially transformed lower courts into devices for
challenging governmental policies and for bypassing higher judges from the Supreme Court of
cassazione, yet lower judges remained initially very cautious in the use of such power due to the
influence higher judges and the executive had on their careers. See D. Piana and A. Vauchez, Il
Consiglio superiore della magistratura (Il Mulino 2012) p. 27-51 (on the relationships between justice
and politics in the post-war period).
42See nn. 76-81. Since the 1960s, also minor government coalition parties (notably, the Socialist
Party) favoured the implementation of constitutional provisions and supported reforms of judicial
governance. This stance was also due to the fact that the Christian Democrats, as the party holding
the larger share of seats, usually retained the Minister of Justice: C. Guarnieri, ‘Origini, problemi
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1970s, a non-hierarchical system was built around self-government with
solid guarantees of independence. This development exemplified the ability of
judges to influence institutional development under favourable political
conditions.43
By the mid-1980s, the system had started to malfunction.44 Disagreement
among governing parties45 and between them and judicial associations (‘correnti’)
generated tensions affecting the functioning of the Consiglio superiore della
magistratura.46 In the first half of the 1990s, the party system collapsed as a result
of political scandals and the indictment of political leaders, and new parties were
established.47 Post-war Italy is often labelled a fragmented consociational
democracy, although one characterised by a certain degree of polarisation.48
After the regime crisis, polarisation was strongly magnified, favoured by the 1993
reform of the Chamber of Deputies’ and the Senate’s electoral systems, which
prompted the rise of an imperfect majoritarian democracy.49 The judiciary settled
at the centre of the political struggles, and clashed with the political classes,
especially with the centre-right parties. This sparked the demand for institutional
adjustment by the same parties. The judiciary and the centre-left parties offered
resistance to these demands.
Over the last 25 years, political debate and legislative initiatives have touched
upon various judicial accountability dimensions. But before this article zeroes in
on the three accountability mechanisms, it will analyse the changes within the
Consiglio superiore della magistratura itself.
e sviluppo delle “correnti giudiziarie”’, in A. Bevere, I magistrati e le correnti. Alla ricerca
dell’indipendenza da se stessi [Magistrates and judicial associations. The quest for independence from
themselves] (ESI 2008) p. 17 at p. 18-20.
43 J. Crowe, ‘The Forging of Judicial Autonomy: Political Entrepreneurship and the Reforms of
William Howard Taft’, 1 The Journal of Politics (2007) p. 73 at p. 84.
44Assessment of the ‘good functioning’ of the Italian system is not based here on any empirical
investigation, but rather on assumptions shared by Italian legal scholars.
45Notably, the Socialist Party and components of the Christian Democrats, M. Bull and
M. Rhodes, Crisis and Transition in Italian Politics (Routledge 1997) p. 164.
46Tensions were raised at the highest levels during Cossiga’s presidency (1985-1992), R. Teresi, La
riforma del Consiglio superiore della magistratura [The Reform of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura] (ESI
1994) p. 16-73, and Benvenuti, supra n. 36, p. 28.
47Silvio Berlusconi entered the political arena with his centre-right organisation; populist
movements such as Lega Nord and MSI-Alleanza Nazionale arose; the centrist Christian Democrat
party blew up into smaller factions; the Communist Party also split between a major social-
democratic party and a smaller entity claiming the communist legacy.
48M. Bogaards, ‘The Italian First Republic: “Degenerated Consociationalism” in a Polarised Party
System’, 2 West European Politics (2007) p. 503 at p. 505 ff.
49F. Lanchester, La Costituzione tra elasticità e rottura [The Constitution between elasticity and
breach] (Giuffrè 2011) p. 131 f.
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Judicial council: a flexible institution at the core of the
reform debate
The foundations
According to the constitutional and legal norms and principles, the Consiglio
superiore della magistratura is the main actor in the administration and governance
of the judiciary. Launched in 1959,50 its tasks include judicial appointments,
assignments, transfers, promotions, and disciplinary measures.51
The Consiglio superiore della magistratura has a mixed composition.52
Judges elect two-thirds of its members from among their peers, and Parliament
in joint session elects the remaining third by two-fifths majority53 from among
law professors and advocates with at least 15 years’ experience. The Constitution
also provides for de jure members: the President of the Republic, the First
President of the Court of cassazione (Italy’s Supreme Court), and the General
Prosecutor. The President of the Republic, an impartial authority with important
political powers within the Italian government, holds the presidency of the
council. The council designates a vice-president from among those members
elected by Parliament.
This complex institutional arrangement was justified by the need to protect
judicial independence in a state in which judges’ subordination to the executive
was traditionally coupled with their weak roots in society.54 It was the outcome of
a difficult compromise between multiple political and judicial actors. The resulting
body is characterised by its mixed legitimacy. The prevailing internal legitimacy
derives from the majority of its members being judges, but is attenuated by the
conferral of the vice-presidency on the member elected by the Parliament, who
acts as chair on a daily basis, in strict collaboration with the President of the
Republic who holds the formal chairmanship. This configuration allows for a
flexible balance between autonomy and indirect influence by the political
environment.55
50Law n. 195 of 25 March 1958.
51Art. 105 of the Italian Constitution.
52Art. 104 of the Italian Constitution.
53Art. 22 of Law n. 195 of 25 March 1958.
54P. Ridola, ‘La formazione dell’ordine del giorno fra poteri presidenziali e poteri dell’Assemblea’
[‘The determination of the agenda between presidential powers and powers of the plenary’], in B. Caravita
(ed.), Magistratura, CSM e principi costituzionali [Judiciary, CSM and constitutional principles]
(Roma-Bari 1994) p. 66.
55See also F. Palermo and J. Woelk, ‘L’indipendenza della Magistratura e le sue garanzie negli
ordinamenti dei Balcani occidentali’, in M. Calamo Specchia et al. (eds.), I Balcani ccidentali. Le
costituzioni della transizione [Western Balkans. The conditions for transition] (Torino 2008) p. 203 at p.
228. This is a different solution from the one originally adopted in France in 1958, which relied
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Over the years, the balance between autonomy and outside influence
has shifted. The Minister of Justice, for instance, initially had an exclusive
right to initiate any procedure allowing the Consiglio superiore della magistratura
to exercise its competencies regarding promotions and appointments to
specific functions.56 The Minister retained this important power until 1963,
when the Constitutional Court limited its exclusive nature.57 Furthermore,
for the appointment of heads of court, the Minister’s consent was necessary.58
More precisely, according to the law, the Consiglio superiore della magistratura
appoints court presidents on a proposal formulated by its competent committee
‘in concert with the Minister of Justice’.59 In 1992, however, the Constitutional
Court made it clear that the notion ‘in concert’ does not involve a veto power of
the Minister, even though the competent committee must truly and fairly seek
agreement.60 In other words, ‘in concert’ does not pertain to the outcome of the
decision, but to the procedure and the method by which the outcome is
determined.
The vicissitudes and the very functioning of the Consiglio superiore
della magistratura depend greatly on the choices made with regard to the system
for selecting members elected by judges from among their peers (‘judicial
component’), foreseen in the law establishing the council.61 TheConsiglio superiore
della magistratura was from its beginnings a body in which judges of the Supreme
Court predominated. This was the result of a category-based system for the
election of judges that favoured the top ranks of the judicial hierarchy.62
solely on the legitimacy derived from the Head of State, who until 1993 designated all nine
councillors, six of whom from among the judicial ranks. The Italian principle of mixed legitimacy,
and its implementation, can be best compared to the French judicial council of 1946 that achieved
mixed legitimacy through the prism of political pluralism. S. Benvenuti, The French and the Italian
high councils for the judiciary. Observations drawn from the analysis of their staff and activity (1947-
2011), Paper presented at the XXII World Congress of Political Science on ‘Challenges of
Contemporary Governance’, Madrid, Spain, 19-24 July 2012.
56Former Art. 11 of Law n. 195 of 25 March 1958.
57 Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 2 December 1963, case no. 168, declaring the
unconstitutionality of Art. 11 of the Law on the exclusive power of initiative. Consequently, the
Consiglio superiore della magistratura can initiate the procedure independently.
58Art. 11 of Law n. 195 of 25 March 1958.
59Art. 11 of Law n. 195 of 25 March 1958.
60 Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 9 July 1992, case no. 379. This did not
completely settle the conflicts and the Constitutional Court had to reiterate its position in Judgment
of 18 December 2003, case no. 380.
61Art. 23 of Law n. 195 of 25 March 1958. In turn, the profile of members elected by the
Parliament is contingent upon the party composition of Parliament, but, as mentioned, these
members are in the minority.
62Accordingly, each magistrate enjoyed the right to give his or her vote only to members
belonging to his or her category (as mentioned, three categories were envisaged). This provided the
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Consequently, the council had a strong hierarchical outlook that improved
internal accountability and involved a certain degree of internal dependence.63
At least hypothetically, junior judges were pressed to follow the case law of the
Court of cassazione, aware that deviations from that Court’s views could bear
consequences for their careers. The judicial hierarchy was therefore able to
determine career advancement through the Italian Supreme Court-dominated
Consiglio superiore della magistratura.
The struggle over the judicial council’s representation
The system for electing judicial members of the council underwent significant reform
in the late 1960s and early 1970s.64 First, the category-based system of representation
was abandoned. Before 1967, magistrates could vote only for candidates belonging to
their own category; now magistrates were allowed to vote for candidates from any
category. Higher magistrates could therefore only be elected with the support of lower
ranking magistrates. In 1975, the majority principle was replaced by a system of
proportional representation within a single national constituency. This required the
presentation of lists of candidates by magistrates.65
Lower judges assembled within judicial associations strongly supported these
reforms. They justified their position by the wish to eliminate the hierarchical
appearance of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura and enhance its democratic
character.66 Furthermore, the potential diversification of its judicial members was
thought to allow for mutual checks and balances among the representatives of the
National Magistrates’ Association’s correnti in the council and to improve the council’s
decision-making autonomy. In terms of accountability, while the system still prioritised
internal accountability, it now responded to a pluralist logic. The distribution of power
within the judiciary changed by disempowering the higher judiciary in favour of rank-
and-file judges and changed the functioning of internal accountability. Judges were no
longer accountable to top court judges, but to their colleagues within the same court or
district. Thus, the traditionally hierarchical system of accountability was replaced by a
Court of Cassation’s members with an advantage over junior judges, Di Federico, supra n. 3, p. 185,
and Pizzorusso, supra n. 24, p. 41. In 1975, the proportion between categories was also rebalanced in
favour of lower judges.
63D. Piana and A. Vauchez, supra n. 41, p. 43-68.
64Law n. 1198 of 18 December 1967 and Law n. 695 of 22 December 1975.
65Until 1967, magistrates of the Corte di cassazione expressed a maximum of nine preferences
within a single district, and the candidates obtaining a majority of votes were elected. Four single-
member districts were envisaged for electing candidates representing courts of appeal, and four for
candidates representing first instance tribunals. See Zanon and Biondi, supra n. 35, p. 32-36.
66G. Ferri, Magistratura e potere politico [Judiciary and political power] (CEDAM 2005) p. 24.
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more complex system in which the correnti took centre stage through their
representatives within the Consiglio superiore della magistratura.
However, in the long-term the ideas of checks and balances and enhanced decisional
autonomywere challenged by the increasingly fossilised influence of judicial associations
and the politicisation of theConsiglio superiore della magistratura due to the proportional
system of representation (upon which basis the associations’ political affiliation became
the dominant factor). The former was particularly apparent, among other reasons,
because of the phenomenon of the so-called ‘lottizzazione’, i.e. informal agreements
concluded among judicial associations during the appointment process to share vacant
positions within the judiciary amongst themselves.67
Since the mid-1980s several proposals have been tabled to change the electoral
system. In 1985, the Christian Democrats – by then the largest governing party –
launched a proposal aimed at neutralising the power of judicial associations within the
Consiglio superiore della magistratura.68 The following year, a request for a referendum on
electoral norms of Law n. 195/1958 establishing theConsiglio superiore della magistratura
was put forth, but the Constitutional Court rejected the possibility of a referendum on
this subject.69 The electoral system was modified in 1990.70 The new Law replaced,
among other things, the national electoral district with four territorial districts.71 The
purpose was to favour territorial rather than politico-ideological representation in order
to de-structure judicial associations and to reduce the council’s politicisation. However,
the law merely had the effect of stabilising the existing equilibrium among judicial
associations thereby limiting internal pluralism. The introduction of a 9% electoral
threshold in fact favoured the major, already-existing associations.72
Further attempts at reform failed73 until 2002.74 Technically, the new law
adopted in that year abolished the system of proportional representation with the
67Guarnieri, supra n. 42, p. 20-23.
68The proposal, which provided for the introduction of the panachage, was discussed in the
‘Parliamentary committee for institutional reforms’ (Commissione Bozzi) established in 1985.
69 Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 16 January 1987, case no. 29. This decision,
asserting the impracticality of abrogating electoral norms that are essential to the functioning of a
constitutional body, assumes the constitutional nature of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura,
which has long been contested by part of the legal scholarship equating it to a mere administrative body.
70Law n. 74 of 12 April 1990.
71The four territorial districts were determined by unifying courts of appeal through drawing lots.
Two magistrates of cassation were elected within a national district.
72Pizzorusso, supra n. 24, p. 43.
73For example, the proposals for introducing the single transferable vote promoted by the
‘Committee for the reform of the electoral system of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura’
(Commissione Balboni) in 1997.
74Law n. 44 of 28 March 2002. The 2002 reform was preceded in 1997 by the ultimately
abandoned constitutional project on Consiglio superiore della magistratura’s reform by the
‘Commissione parlamentare per le riforme istituzionali’, on which see n. 81 below.
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lists affiliated with judicial associations. It introduced a majority system within a
re-established single national electoral district.75 The first objective of the law was
to align the election of the judicial members of the council with the system for the
election of members of Parliament, and thus to achieve systematic coherence with
provisions regulating the formation of the legislative branch. However, it is
difficult to see why the council’s judicial members’ electoral system needed fine-
tuning to make it correspond with the electoral system of Parliament, as the two
bodies had different goals. A second objective of the law was to facilitate the
formation of stable majorities within the council, but, again, this objective was
open to criticism, as there was no real need for stable majorities in the Consiglio
superiore della magistratura as there was in parliamentary bodies. The real, more or less
hidden, reason for reform was in fact the wish to tackle the fossilised influence of
judicial associations. In this respect, however, the reform was totally ineffective due to
the reintroduction of a national electoral constituency, which gave greater control to
nationally-structured associations (while the parcelling of electoral districts favoured,
at least theoretically, smaller and newly-established associations).
In order to properly contextualise and understand the outlined reform, it needs to
be added that, in the meantime, council jurisdiction had expanded. Instead of a
‘mono-functional’ body focused on managing judicial careers it became a multi-
functional body with increased powers.76 The new powers included administrative
competencies relating to court administration,77 which in some cases had a normative
or ‘para-normative’ character;78 the coordination of the criminal policies of public
prosecutors;79 advisory powers relating to judicial policies (acts and regulations);80 and
75 In addition, according to this law, three different categories of judicial members are created:
representatives of the Court of Cassation (two members), judges (ten members) and prosecutors
(four members). All magistrates vote for all three categories.
76Some of these powers were centralised by marginalising local judicial councils (‘consigli
giudiziari’) established at the Court of Appeal level. These are elective bodies presided over by the
president of the Court of Appeal. Local judicial councils de facto prepare most of the day-to-day
decisions adopted by the Consiglio superiore della magistratura.
77These competences moved from the Minister of Justice and the presidents of courts and
tribunals to the Consiglio superiore della magistratura. This shift happened de facto and was formally
acknowledged in 1988. On the widened scope of the Council’s competences see Pizzorusso, supra
n. 24, p. 44.
78Such as directives, Benvenuti, supra n. 36, p. 57.
79A good example is the establishment of the Commissione Antimafia on 15 October 1982.
80A second possibility is to give opinions on legislative drafts or to propose projects affecting the
judicial system. The latter was first acknowledged by Art. 10 of the Law n. 195 of 24 March 1958.
However, this law provided a restrictive interpretation of the relative power that was limited to an
internal ‘dialogue’ between the Consiglio superiore della magistratura and the Minister of Justice on
government bills. The council in practice started interacting directly with the Parliament, providing
opinions in relation to bills, even during their discussion in Parliament.
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public statements.81 Overall, this magnified the power of the Consiglio superiore della
magistratura in the political arena.
Judicial career: dismantling the hierarchy
As mentioned above, the career system of the Italian judiciary follows the
bureaucratic model. Hence, judges are recruited at a relatively young
age after graduation from law school. According to Article 106 of the
1948 Constitution, ‘[j]udges are appointed through competitive
examinations’.82 The same article states that ‘[f]ollowing a proposal by the
judicial council, university professors in the field of law and lawyers with
fifteen years of practice and registered in specific professional rolls for
higher courts, may be appointed for their outstanding merits as Supreme Court
judges in Italy’. This provision was implemented only 50 years later,83 and
the number of judges recruited in this way is still small.84 One reason for this is the
judicial domination of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura, whose corporatist
attitude prevented the opening up of judicial recruitment. In 2001, a new law
was enacted to allow a second alternative recruitment channel, this time for
lawyers with a certain amount of experience.85 However, the judiciary de facto
remains a highly restricted profession with a single, traditional recruitment
channel.
The career system is structured by Article 107(3) of the Constitution. It
establishes that ‘[m]agistrates are distinguished only by their different functions’.
A broad interpretation of this provision since the mid-1960s led to the progressive
81See L. Carlassare, ‘Quattro note sul Presidente della Repubblica nel Consiglio superiore della
magistratura’ [‘Four notes on the President of the Republic in the Consiglio superiore della magistratura’],
1 Politica del diritto (1986) p. 151, and Benvenuti, supra n. 36, p. 65 ff. This expansion explains the
proposal to reduce the powers of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura contained in an (ultimately
abandoned) constitutional reform project drafted in 1997. This project included a provision
according to which the council carried out ‘exclusive’ administrative functions with regard to
recruitment, appointments and promotions, Art. 124 of the draft project of the parliamentary
committee for constitutional reforms (1997-1998).
82 In 1948, the principle had already been established that recruitment was possible through
public competitive examinations, and without any probationary period, see Law n. 6878 of 8 June
1890. The system has not changed since. The need for greater skills and proficiency and
proper selection just led to the addition of new requirements for participation in examinations, see
Law n. 127 of 15 May 1997, Legislative Decree n. 26 of 30 January 2006, Law n. 111 of 30
July 2007.
83Law n. 303 of 5 August 1998.
84Direct recruitment cannot exceed 10% of the members of the Court, but the number of judges
actually appointed is extremely low.
85Law n. 48 of 13 February 2001. This alternative competitive examination is open to lawyers
younger than 45, who have five years’ experience.
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abolition of judicial ranks.86 Within this system, judges can be formally promoted
to a higher position and gain salary increases, even though they retain the same
(lower) function.87 Formal positions are not indeed limited in number – this is
why it is labelled as system of ‘open positions’ (‘ruoli aperti’).88
The promotion to higher positions was originally based on seniority rather than
on substantive criteria, since public competitive scrutiny was abolished and judges’
evaluations did not take place on a regular basis.89 Consequently, promotions to
higher positions became de facto automatic. Scholars described this system
succinctly as ‘promotion without demerits’, to indicate that automatism was
blocked only in cases of evident faults.90 In fact, this system had initially positive
effect since it greatly contributed to the emancipation of judges from the judicial
hierarchy. However, it generated side effects in the long run. Automatism strongly
weakened accountability for career advancement to higher formal positions, which
in turn negatively affected magistrates’ professionalism in practice. At the same
time, the Consiglio superiore della magistratura, dominated by judicial associations,
retained huge leeway in making appointments to specific functions, which
strengthened internal accountability.91
In order to counteract these two tendencies, the Parliament approved
two general reforms between 2005 and 2007.92 While maintaining the
seniority rule for advancement, the 2005 law introduced a merit-based
assessment through written and oral examinations for promotion to a higher
position. The 2007 law improved the system by introducing a regular
86Law n. 392 of 24 May 1951, Law n. 570 of 25 July 1966 and Law n. 831 of 20 December
1973. The former abolished ranks and established three categories of magistrates: tribunal, appeal,
and cassation. The two latter laws abolished competitive examinations-based promotion from one
category (position) to the other, so that promotion became possible based on seniority according to
the category and following the evaluation of local judicial councils and a decision of the Consiglio
superiore della magistratura. Thirteen years’ experience is required to become a judge of appeal and 28
years to become a judge of cassation.
87Following Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 19 May 1982, case no. 86, it was
not possible to be appointed as a judge of cassation without exercising the relevant functions, but
magistrates were qualified for appointment and relative salary benefits were preserved.
88Pizzorusso, supra n. 24, p. 45-50.
89Evaluation is a task of local judicial councils. It is based on observations by the court president
and is subsequently approved by the Consiglio superiore della magistratura, see for example Art. 3 of
Law n. 570 of 25 July 1966.
90G. Di Federico, ‘Statuto, carriera e indipendenza dei magistrati ordinari in Italia’ [‘Statute,
career and independence of ordinary magistrates in Italy’], 1 Rivista trimestrale di diritto e procedura civile
(1973) p. 1577 at p. 1589; see also Silvestri, supra n. 31, p. 162-169; Guarnieri, supra n. 40, p. 350. This
is a notable example of simulated judicial accountability, Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 70.
91Guarnieri, supra n. 42.
92Law n. 150 of 25 July 2005, Legislative Decree n. 160 of 5 April 2006, and Law n. 111 of 30
July 2007, n. 111.
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evaluation process.93 The law also created a commission made up of judges,
university professors, and qualified lawyers to assist the Consiglio superiore della
magistratura in assessing scientific analytical competencies and skills necessary to
be appointed as a Supreme Court judge.94 Finally, it introduced the rule that court
presidents are appointed for four years, with the possibility of reappointment for
four more years.95 Overall, the 2005-2007 reforms, which were approved by a
centre-right and a centre-left majority respectively and witnessed a coincidence of
intents, have proven to be ineffective mainly due to internal resistance against
implementation. Only the measures aimed at regulating assessment for appointing
heads of courts or members of the Supreme Court were successful.
Disciplinary responsibility: the long journey distancing itself
from its bureaucratic approach
The Constitution gives the Consiglio superiore della magistratura the power to adopt
disciplinary measures against magistrates96 upon the initiative of the Minister of
Justice.97 The law also confers the General Prosecutor with the power to initiate
disciplinary procedures.98 The disciplinary section of the Consiglio superiore della
magistratura consists of the vice-president of the council (a non-judicial member
elected by the Parliament), who presides over it, and five members, four of whom are
magistrates.99 According to legal scholarship, the disciplinary accountability
framework is a constitutional (and not merely a bureaucratic) structure, since it
involves the collaboration of the three state powers:100 the Minister of Justice initiates
the procedure based on the general framework for disciplinary offences and
procedural guarantees set by the Parliament, while the Consiglio superiore della
93Art. 2 of Law n. 111/2007, amending Art. 11 of Legislative Decree n. 160/2006. During the
first 28 years of a judge’s career, the judicial council now formulates a reasoned assessment every four
years. A negative assessment can involve the obligation to attend a training course, re-appointment to
different functions, and even being forbidden from exercising given functions. Furthermore, judges
cannot carry out the same functions for more than 10 years.
94See Art. 12, subsection 13, of Legislative Decree n. 160 of 5 April 2006. The reason for such a
requirement lies in the constitutional relevance of a supreme court, which carries out functions
inherently different from those exercised by lower courts, and connected to what Italian and French
academics have termed as ‘proactive’ or ‘normative’ functions, Taruffo, supra n. 23, p. 123 ff.;
L. Cadiet, ‘Problèmes et perspectives de la Cour de cassation française’ [‘Problems and perspectives of
the French Cour de cassation’], in Besso and Chiarloni (eds.), supra n. 22, p. 55 at p. 58.
95Art. 2 of Law n. 111/2007, amending Arts. 45 and 56 of Legislative Decree n. 160/2006.
96Arts. 105 and Art 107(1) of the Italian Constitution.
97Art. 107(2) of the Italian Constitution. Before 1946, theMinister of Justice was vested with full
disciplinary powers, Giuliani and Picardi, supra n. 40, p. 148.
98Art. 14 of Law n. 195/1958 and Art. 14(3) of Law Decree n. 109 of 23 February 2006.
99Art. 105 of the Italian Constitution and Art. 4 of the Law n. 195/1958.
100M. Vietti, L’ordinamento giudiziario [The judicial system] (Giappichelli 2003) p. 60.
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magistratura (rectius, its disciplinary section) is in charge of the disciplinary decisions.
However, the original framework is characterised by a certain ambiguity.
Only in a 1971 decision has the Constitutional Court explicitly acknowledged the
jurisdictional character of the disciplinary procedure.101 The Court stated that the
disciplinary section is equivalent to a court (which explains the appeal to the Supreme
Court, which decides upon it in joint session)102 and that ‘the law, through explicit and
unambiguous provisions, conferred jurisdictional character to the function carried out
by the disciplinary section’.103 Nevertheless, hearings were not public. The Consiglio
superiore della magistratura did not introduce the possibility of public hearings until
1985, and a law formalised the principle of public hearings only in 1990.104
According to Article 107(1) of the Constitution, a judge may be suspended or
assigned to a different function following a decision taken based on rules set by a
law. Still, disciplinary offences had not been clearly defined until recently. Article
18 of the Royal Decree n. 511 of 1946 merely provided that a judge may be
disciplined when he or she fails to maintain the duties of the office, shows
untrustworthy and/or inconsiderate behaviour, or damages the reputation
(‘prestigio’) of the judiciary.105 In practice, even the most serious breaches of
professional competencies, unless externally disclosed, were considered irrelevant,
contrary to minor breaches that could harm the prestige of the judiciary.106
The disciplinary section of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura had to fill in
these very vague concepts (duties of the office, untrustworthy behaviour, reputation of
the judiciary) in accordance with its own opinions.107 This had two consequences.
First the normative and the jurisdictional dimensions de facto became blurred within
the disciplinary section, seriously undermining its impartiality.108 Second, corporatist
consensus among judicial associations (represented in the disciplinary section)
favoured loose definitions of disciplinary offences, making the system ineffective and
causing disciplinary responsibility to go underused.
101 Judgment of 2 February 1971, case no. 12.
102Art. 17 of Law n. 195/1958.
103 In this decision, the rule of in camera hearings and the diminished role of the advocate were at
stake, among other matters; notwithstanding its clear position, the Court considered these two
constitutional questions unfounded.
104Art. 1 of Law 74/1990, which maintains the possibility of exceptions
105This decree was adopted before the Constitution and envisaged a disciplinary court and
disciplinary tribunals, jurisdictional in character, thus reforming the previous system based on a
politico-bureaucratic understanding of disciplinary responsibility, Vietti, supra n. 100, p. 52.
106Zanon and Biondi, supra n. 35, p. 282.
107The plenary of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura also contributed to define disciplinary
offences by resorting to its ‘para-normative’ powers, on which see supra n. 78.
108Vietti, supra n. 100, p. 54 ff. Hence, while the disciplinary system is no longer based on the old
bureaucratic approach many commentators have underlined its practical shortcomings, Zanon and
Biondi, supra n. 35, p. 328.
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In reaction, the Italian Parliament somewhat formalised the definitions of
disciplinary offences in 2005 and 2006. It is noteworthy that this was also the
consequence of a 2001 European Court of Human Rights decision which
criticised the lack of foreseeability of disciplinary offences.109 The law also
increased the Minister’s powers for the procedures in disciplinary investigations
and indictments.110 In turn, it addressed the ‘legalisation’ of disciplinary
procedure, regarding the right to defence and the public viewing of hearings,
cancelling all traces of a typical bureaucratic form of jurisdiction.111
Civil liability: the untouchable judges – and their demise?
Civil liability can be a mechanism for holding judges accountable for the
exercise of their judicial functions. Here we must distinguish between State
liability and individual liability.112 In Italy, the State’s liability traditionally
overshadows individual liability. Individuals cannot sue judges directly; they can
hold only the State liable for the misdeeds of a judge. Until 1988, the State could
sue judges only in a very limited array of situations compared with other civil
servants, and only as a right of recovery in case the State itself had been sued for a
judge’s behaviour.113
Articles 55, 56, and 74 of the (still in force) 1940 Code of Civil Procedure114
confined a judge’s civil liability to wilful misconduct, fraud, or misfeasance (‘dolo,
frode o concussione’), and unreasonable refusal, omission, or delay in accomplishing a
required procedure or legal obligation.115 Individual complaints required theMinister
of Justice’s authorisation to start the procedure to determine a judge’s liability. If
authorisation was given, the Supreme Court selected the competent judge.116
109ECthR 2 August 2001, Case No. 37119/97 NF v Italy. Art. 1(1) and 2(6)-(7) of Law n. 150/
2005 and Arts. 2, 3 and 4 of Legislative decree n. 109/2006 introduced three categories of
disciplinary offences depending on whether they have been committed during or outside the exercise
of the judicial functions and whether they result from committing a crime.
110See notably Art. 2(6) of Law n. 150/2005 and Arts. 1-4, 14, and 17 of Legislative Decree n. 106/
2006.
111Zanon and Biondi, supra n. 35, p. 317-321; Giuliani and Picardi, supra n. 42, p. 149. ‘Legalisation’
of accountability implies the reliance on stricter legal standards, Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 38.
112Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 82.
113Therefore, only the State was liable vis-à-vis individuals. The restrictive approach is derived from
the 19th century liberal idea that judging was an expression of State sovereignty and judicial decisions
were fully ascribable to the legislative will, Zanon and Biondi, supra n. 35, p. 321 ff.
114These three articles derive directly from Art. 783 of the 1865 Code of Civil Procedure.
115Art. 55 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1940.
116Art. 56. This article was in clear breach of Art. 25(1) of the Italian Constitution, establishing the
principle of the legal judge. According Judgment of the Italian Constitutional court of 11 March
1968, case no. 2, the Minister’s authorisation was not necessary to claim for State liability.
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In 1987, a referendum was held to repeal the aforementioned articles of the
Code of Civil Procedure with the aim of pushing Parliament to introduce the
direct civil liability of judges in case of gross negligence (‘colpa grave’). This initiative
followed a striking episode of poor administration of justice117 as well as criticism
from sectors of the political élite irritated by supposedly politically-biased public
prosecutions of party members. The referendum resulted in the abrogation of
Articles 55, 56, and 74 of the Italian Civil Code, which created a legal gap that
Parliament was called upon to fill.118
Parliament subsequently119 maintained the principle that individuals can
sue only the State, but extended the number of cases in which the State, within
one year after it has paid compensation, can take recourse against a judge. Liability
is incurred when the individual suffers material or non-material damage
that is caused not only by wilful misconduct (‘dolo’) or a denial of justice, but
also in case of gross negligence (‘colpa grave’).120 Thus, even unintentional acts can
give rise to civil liability.121 The new law also established a ‘safeguard clause’
(‘clausola di salvaguardia’), according to which interpretations of legal provisions
and assessments of facts and evidence can give no occasion for civil liability.122
The act also codified the rights of the defendant judge and introduced a
stricter procedure for the selection of the competent judge.123 Moreover, a
declaration of admissibility of the claim by the tribunal replaced the Minister’s
authorisation.124
Scholars consider the overall impact of the 1988 Law to be minimal.125 First,
not only was the extension of the second-degree liability of judges very restrictive,
117 In 1983, the journalist Enzo Tortora was indicted and arrested on the basis of serious criminal
charges, for which he was sentenced to 10 years in prison in 1985. However, the Court of Appeal
acknowledged his innocence in 1986.
118M. Graziadei and U. Mattei, ‘Judicial Responsibility in Italy: A New Statute’, 1 The American
Journal of Comparative Law (1990) p. 103.
119Law n. 117 of 13 April 1988.
120Arts. 2 and 7 of Law n. 117 of 13 April 1988.
121 ‘Gross negligence’ was limited to specific cases, Art. 2(3). Art. 3 also provides a detailed
definition of denial of justice. See G.F. Ferrari, Introduction to Italian Public Law (Giuffrè 2008)
p. 180; E. Tira, ‘La responsabilità civile dei magistrati: evoluzione normativa e proposte di riforma’
[‘Civil liability of judges: legislative development and reform proposals’], 4 Rivista AIC (2011) p. 1 at p.
5-8. The individual can ask for compensation for non-material damage, and for material damage
deriving from deprivation of liberty.
122Art. 2. The Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 11 January 1989, case no. 18,
considered this clause essential to protect the impartiality of the judge.
123Arts. 6 and 4.
124Art. 5 and Judgment of the Italian Constitutional Court of 9 October 1990, case no. 468.
125 In the majority of cases, inadmissibility was declared at a preliminary stage; in case of admissibility,
the liability of the State was affirmed very rarely – even less so the liability of the individual judge, Zanon
and Biondi, supra n. 35, p. 327. See also Giuliani and Picardi, supra n. 42, p. 155.
388 Simone Benvenuti EuConst 14 (2018)
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019618000214
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Masaryk University Brno School of Social Studies, on 13 Jul 2020 at 14:34:54, subject to the
but it also contradicted the underlying rationale of the 1987 referendum by
maintaining the inability to sue judges directly. Indeed, the heated debate
preceding the referendum addressed the increase of individual judges’
accountability by introducing direct civil liability, not just the need to grant
compensation to individuals who had suffered damage(s). Second, the judges
themselves impeded the reform by interpreting the new provisions in a highly
restrictive way. This had bearing on and affected all phases of the legal process,
from the declaration of admissibility to the actual judging of individual liability.126
Dissatisfaction with the legislative outcome of the 1987 referendum alone does
not explain why civil liability has since often entered the political debate. Another
explanation lies in the tide of judicial activism known as Mani pulite (Clean
hands), that contributed to the legitimacy crisis of the political elite in the first half
of the 1990s,127 and that continued the subsequent 20 years, exacerbating the
conflict between the judiciary and Berlusconi’s newly-founded party.128 New
referendum proposals were submitted in 1996 and 1999, but were rejected by the
Constitutional Court for lack of clarity inherent to the question.129 Centre-right
parties used the possibility of reforming the legislative framework as a threat
against the judiciary.130 Governmental bills attempted to introduce direct judicial
liability for fraud and to simplify the procedure in cases of gross negligence. The
main centre-left party also called for reform, but in a more balanced way, while
judicial associations strongly opposed it. At stake were not just citizens’ rights, i.e.
the protection of citizens against miscarriages of justice and the ability of citizens to
demand compensation even in cases of negligence, but also a just balance between
justice and politics. Many asserted that episodes of judicial over-zealousness risked –
and in some cases actually led to – influencing political dynamics.131
126M. Nisticò, ‘La nuova legge sulla responsabilità civile dello Stato e dei magistrati.
Inquadramento storico-sistematico e profili problematici’ [‘The new law on State and judges’ civil
liability. Historical framework and problematic issues’], Osservatorio Costituzionale AIC (2015) p. 1 at
p. 6 ff., Zanon and Biondi, supra n. 35, p. 326 ff.
127C. Bohlen, ‘Italy’s “Clean hands” Judges Bite Their Nails’, The New York Times, 2 June 1995, p. 3;
A. Vannucci, ‘The Controversial Legacy of “Mani Pulite”: A Critical Analysis of Italian Corruption and
Anti-Corruption Policies’, 2 Bulletin of Italian Politics (2009) p. 233 at p. 233-236.
128On the regime crisis, see supra nn. 47-49.
129Zanon and Biondi, supra n. 35, p. 326 ff.
130 In 2012, a proposal for amendment presented by a member of the populist party Lega Nord,
aimed at introducing individual liability for ‘manifest infringement of the law’, including the
possibility of suing the judge. The amendment was about to be approved but was eventually rejected.
131 It can hardly be denied that prosecutions against centre-right party members and Prime
Minister Berlusconi in the 1990s and 2000s, extending in the 2010s to centre-left as well,
importantly determined the course of political events and further aggravated political instability.
In this regard, Italy is a forerunner of this specific dimension of judicialisation of politics that has
concerned other European democracies.
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In the end, internal and external pressures resulted in the adoption of a new
law on civil liability in February 2015.132 The law maintained the principle
of the indirect liability of judges. However, it limited the ‘safeguard clause’
and broadened the categories of gross negligence and wilful misconduct.133 It
also removed the filter for the admissibility of the complaint134 and made
the complaint of the State against individual judges (in case the State itself
had been convicted for the behaviour of the judge in question) mandatory
and stricter.135 Although the law did not fundamentally alter the civil liability
framework, it marks a further step toward the increased civil liability of judges.
The impact of the law still needs to be assessed, but the dogma of individual
non-liability is fading away.
Conclusion
The previous sections focused on Italian reforms in three crucial areas for judicial
accountability. They shed light on how the judicial accountability framework has
changed over time and the conditions under which this happened. Leaving aside any
consideration as to what the right balance in the judicial accountability framework
should be, the Italian experience indicates the dynamism of such a balance.136 In
Italy, this balance shifted between the 1950s and the 1980s from a hierarchical system
blending external accountability to the executive with internal accountability to the
higher judiciary, to a framework of prevailingly internal accountability rooted in the
centralisation of the judiciary’s management of the (by the judicial associations
dominated) Consiglio superiore della magistratura. Against this situation marked by
institutional imbalance, a reaction followed starting in the second half of the 1980s,
attempting to strengthen judicial accountability.
Collectively, the reforms adopted in the last 20 years followed three directions
and revealed the underlying tension regarding accountability. First, they aimed to
reduce the power of judicial associations within the Consiglio superiore della
magistratura and to counter internal accountability. Second, they aimed to
improve professional accountability, limitations to which stem from both out-
dated recruitment mechanisms and the crystallisation of the seniority rule for
career advancement. Third, they ‘legalised’ the disciplinary procedure and made
individual civil liability effective.137




136On this dynamic see Garoupa and Ginsburg, supra n. 4, p. 118.
137See supra n. 111. This process was also stimulated as mentioned by international jurisprudence,
notably ECthR 2 August 2001, Case No. 37119/97 NF v Italy.
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This shows that the issue of reforming the institutional framework to adjust the
balance must be addressed from time to time. To be sure, Italy is exemplary in this
regard, yet it is not an exception. Similar dynamics characterise countries where
politico-judicial relations are complex, a lack of homogeneity within the political
and the judicial elites exists, or the party system lacks consolidation. While
exceptional in this regard, the backlash in countries such as Hungary and Poland
can be interpreted to an extent within this framework.138 However, this trait is not
unique to unstable or weakly-consolidated democracies.139
Therefore, this article argues that it is difficult to ensure a proper and stable
balance in the accountability framework and to define any balance ex ante and
generally, due to the naturally unstable socio-political background and changing
centre of gravity in politico-judicial relations. One will not achieve a proper
balance in the accountability framework by the implementation of one-size-fits-all
(and all-time) templates; rather one should try to achieve a substantive equilibrium
among the relevant actors in a specific context. Judicial accountability (like judicial
independence) is neither a dogma nor a unitary concept, but an instrumental
and multidimensional concept which needs to be in accordance with underlying
socio-political conditions. Moreover, as the balance changes over time,
institutional arrangements and relationships evolve, and judicial government
bodies are among some of the most important, one should reassess the balance
from time to time.
This brings us to the lessons from the Italian-derived judicial council template.
This article demystifies the myth about the Italian ‘self-government’ body in two
ways. On the one hand, since its inception in 1948, the Consiglio superiore della
magistratura was designed to ensure judicial accountability and not merely
(external) judicial independence.140 As a mixed institution, the council was indeed
flexible enough in drawing up a satisfactory accountability balance.141 The
138M. Bánkuti et al., ‘Disabling the Constitution’, 23 Journal of Democracy (2012) p. 142-144; A.
Sanders and L. von Danwitz, ‘The Polish Judiciary Reform: Problematic under European Standards
and a Challenge for Germany’, VerfBlog, 28 March 2017, <verfassungsblog.de/the-polish-judiciary-
reform-problematic-under-european-standards-and-a-challenge-for-germany/>, visited 17 April
2018. There, while current developments are inseparable from the broader picture of
constitutional weakening, these are also a consequence of the unsatisfactory imbalance among
domestic actors.
139The French case, with constitutional changes affecting the judicial council in 1946, 1958,
1993, and 2008, and a reform proposal being further discussed by the French Parliament in 2013, is
also exemplary in this regard.
140Caution in relating the independence of the judiciary with judicial independence underlies the
need to pay greater attention on individual independence of judges. On this, seeD. Kosař, ‘Politics of
Judicial Independence and Judicial Accountability in Czechia: Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law
between Court Presidents and the Ministry of Justice’, 13 EuConst (2017) p. 96.
141Garoupa and Ginsburg, supra n. 4, p. 130.
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flexibility of the Italian judicial council template, which explains its success and
persistence over space and time,142 also makes it clear that – paraphrasing Adrian
Vermeule – the council is a ‘many’, not a ‘one’.143 This is emphasised by the
diverging perceptions of the Consiglio superiore della magistratura that, under a
stable constitutional umbrella, underwent various changes over time. Today, the
European institutional landscape is populated by a variety of such institutions
that, under the ‘judicial council’ classification, work as tools with several functions,
even with divergent utility and accountability rationales.
In short, the Italian example shows that flexibility is necessary to create a
complex institutional framework in harmony with domestic conditions. From a
normative perspective, what truly matters in accountability arrangements is the
existence of a ‘system of checks and balances… which prevents any principal from
taking control of the majority of the accountability mechanisms’.144 This
consideration mirrors the stress placed by Italian legal scholarship on the
importance of the composite structure of the Consiglio superiore della
magistratura.145 The council’s mixed composition was indeed essential to its
proper functioning, and resulted from the constitutional and legal provisions first,
but also from the social conditions of the judiciary and the political contexts.146
This need to take the social conditions of the judiciary and the political contexts
into account also puts the concept of the judicial council as a body made up of a
majority of magistrates into perspective. The rationale behind the creation of the
judicial council may lie in the principle of self-government, but can also have roots
in the principle of a balance among powers. Looking at the council as a tool of
judicial independence, without referring to its mixed judicial accountability, leaves
an inaccurate or partial understanding of this body.
This is actually a major problem of Opinion No. 18 (2015), mentioned in the
first paragraphs of this article. In its commendable praise for increased
accountability of the judiciary, the advisory body of the Council of Europe
unfortunately approaches judicial councils only as ‘representatives of the
judiciary’.147 While this is not in itself totally wrong, it insufficiently defines the
nature of judicial councils and fails to address the ultimate premise for their
establishment. In turn, Opinion No. 10 (2007) of the Consultative Council of
142Garoupa and Ginsburg, supra n. 4, p. 130.
143A. Vermeule, ‘The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Two Fallacies of Interpretive Theory’,
University of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 49, p. 1.
144Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 410.
145Ridola, supra n. 54.
146This explains why, before the regime crisis, pressure for institutional change followed the
decrease in the council’s internal substantive pluralism, due to judicial associations’ corporatist
attitudes and the phenomenon of ‘lottizzazione’, see supra n. 67.
147Para. 31.
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European Judges, on judicial councils rightly stresses the mixed nature of the
councils and the relevance of electing judicial members (a principle that is
supposed to allow pluralism, even though the Italian case warns against such
immediate correlation). Still, the principle that judges should be the majority may
prove too rigid, also in consideration of the structural information asymmetries in
their favour. Imposing a template may limit the councils’ main assets: their
flexibility and a mixed composition. In this regard, the Action Plan of the Council
of Europe on strengthening judicial independence and impartiality displays more
cautiously reasoned formulations when it comes to judicial councils.148
Scholars have therefore rebuked the problematic transplant of a ‘strong’ and
judicially-dominated council in countries lacking significant segmentations within
relatively small judiciaries, or where powerful judicial actors such as court
presidents exist.149 Institutional solutions need fine-tuning within their respective
context. Several aspects are critical in this respect: awareness of the social structure
of the judiciary, of its size, and of its internal segmentations, of the relevant agents
and internal dynamics, of the relationships of their components within the broader
political arenas and the structure of the political system. It is necessary to
emphasise once more that the very features of any alleged accountability
framework are based on historical legacies150 as well as on the social and political
background, since judiciaries are not monolithic bodies, but are internally marked
by social and institutional segmentation.151
A proper understanding of existing councils and their internal structures in
relation to these contextual elements is necessary. Identifying these conditions, to
which little attention has been devoted, should be a task of future scholarship in
this field. This would allow an assessment of conformity to substantive principles
rather than to formal templates.
148Council of Europe, Plan of action on strengthening judicial independence and impartiality, CM
(2016)36 final, April 2016.
149Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 301. D. Smilov, ‘EU Enlargement and the Constitutional Principle of
Judicial Independence’, in W. Sadurski et al. (eds.), Spreading Democracy and the Rule of Law? The
Impact of EU Enlargement for the Rule of Law, Democracy and Constitutionalism in Post-Communist
Legal Orders (Springer 2006) p. 313, is one of the first writings taking on a critical stance in this
regard.
150Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 411.
151Kosař, supra n. 1, p. 393; Vermeule, supra n. 143.
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